SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR DYNAMICALLY CONTROLLING A ROGUE APPLICATION THROUGH INCREMENTAL BANDWIDTH RESTRICTIONS

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Field of the Invention

The present invention relates in general to network traffic control and, in particular, to a system and method for dynamically controlling a rogue application through incremental bandwidth restrictions.

Background of the Invention

Distributed computing environments, particularly enterprise computing environments, typically comprise an collection of individual subnetworks interconnected both within and externally via hubs, routers, switches and similar devices. These subnetworks generally fall into two categories. Intranetworks, or Local Area Networks (LANs), are computer networks physically defined within a geographically limited area, such as within an office building. Intranetworks typically operate with a bandwidth of 10 Mbps to 100 Mbps or higher.

Internetworks, or Wide Area Networks (WANs), are computer networks physically defined over a geographically distributed area utilizing private and leased lines obtained through digital communications service providers. The Internet is an example of a widely available public internetwork. Due to the

increased complexity of communicating over long distances, network traffic exchanged over internetworks is significantly more costly and generally travels much more slowly than network traffic sent over intranetworks. Internetworks typically operate with a bandwidth of 1.544 Mbps (for a T1 carrier) to 44.7 Mbps (for a T3 carrier) or higher.

Commonly, both intranetworks and internetworks operate in accordance with the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), such as described in W.R. Stevens, "TCP/IP Illustrated, Vol. 1, The Protocols," Chs. 1-3, Addison Wesley (1994), the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference. TCP/IP is a layered networking protocol, comprising a media layer on the physical side, upwards through link, network, transport and application layers. The link and network layers are point-to-point layers and the transport and application layers are end-to-end layers. Packets travel end-to-end and include both source and destination addresses and ports to identify the location of and logical channels on their originating and receiving hosts, respectively. Intranetworks are often interconnected to internetworks and gateway routers are used to provide transparent translations of device addresses between subdomain address spaces and the internetwork domain address spaces.

A traffic manager can be co-located at the network domain boundary with a gateway router to monitor and analyze transient packet traffic for use in traffic analysis and flow control. Traffic managers optimize bandwidth utilization on internetwork connections, as these connections are costly and relatively slow compared to intranetwork connections. In addition, some traffic managers perform load balancing to ensure even traffic distribution.

Typically, traffic managers implement bandwidth utilization policies that attempt to balance the needs of individual end-user applications competing for a limited share of the bandwidth available over the internetwork connection. Thus, a traffic manager will first examine the contents of network traffic packets to determine the application to which each packet belongs. Based on the policies in force, the traffic manager will either restrict or relax the bandwidth allocated to each application.

A problem arises with a certain class of proscribed or "rogue" applications. These applications resist efforts at detection and actively take evasive actions or some forms of negative response when placed under a bandwidth restriction by a traffic manager. Evasive action is known as *morphing*, whereby the rogue application dynamically changes the operational characteristics of network packet traffic in response to a perceived restriction on the allocated bandwidth. The evasive actions often consist of a switching of client-server roles or the reassignment of source and destination addresses and ports, also known as address or port "hopping."

One specific rogue application that has recently become problematic, particularly in academic network settings, is an on-line music exchange service, known as "Napster." The Napster service deploys particularly aggressive forms of rogue applications which attempt to monopolize a maximum amount of available internetwork bandwidth. Other related, but not quite as aggressive, services include Gnutella, Imesh, and Scour, although other forms of rogue applications exist and still others continue to evolve.

In the prior art, firewalls provide one solution to combating bandwidth monopolization by rogue applications. A typical firewall will apply a packet filter based on network addresses to disallow proscribed packet traffic originating from or destined to identified machines. However, firewalls are inflexible and offer an all-or-nothing solution. The use of packet filters requires *a priori* knowledge of the network addresses utilized by rogue applications and firewalls are therefore easily overridden by simply dynamically changing the network addresses in use.

Prior art traffic managers also provide limited protection against rogue applications. These devices block network traffic generated by rogue applications based on a broader set of characteristics, including the network ports and traffic direction flow. However, traffic managers are not capable of detecting evasive actions and are therefore easily overridden using the same tactics as for firewalls.

Therefore, there is a need for an approach to identifying and controlling rogue applications in traffic-managed distributed computing environments. Preferably, such an approach would systematically limit bandwidth usage by each

rogue application without triggering any evasive actions or other forms of negative response.

There is a further need to provide an approach to identifying and controlling rogue applications through a dynamic feedback mechanism. Preferably, such an approach would detect the bandwidth restriction threshold which will trigger evasive action or other form of negative response and then incrementally relax any network restrictions until a point of acquiescence is achieved.

Summary of the Invention

The present invention provides a system and method for identifying and controlling proscribed rogue applications that take evasive actions or other forms of negative response and attempt to monopolize limited internetwork bandwidth. Packet traffic flows are analyzed and the individual operational characteristics of each packet are checked against those characteristics known to be used by packets exchanged with rogue applications. These operational characteristics include network addresses, ports and semantic characteristics, such as keywords and packet lengths. Upon identifying a flow belonging to a rogue application, the bandwidth is incrementally restricted until an evasive action or other form of negative response is triggered. Thereafter, the bandwidth is relaxed by at least one increment to avoid triggering evasive action or other form of negative response.

An embodiment of the present invention is a system and method for managing network traffic exchanged with a proscribed application capable of taking evasive action. Flow characteristics of network traffic are analyzed. The network traffic includes a multiplicity of transient packets. Each packet includes a parameterized header. Operational characteristics are retrieved from the parameterized header of each such transient packet generated by a plurality of intercommunicating applications. A proscribed application is identified by comparing the operational characteristics to stored characteristics unique to the proscribed application. Transmission of each such transient packet subsequently exchanged with the proscribed application is controlled.

A further embodiment is a system and method for dynamically controlling a rogue application through incremental bandwidth restrictions. A network connection supporting a flow of network traffic in a distributed computing environment is monitored. The network traffic flow includes a stream of data packets generated by a rogue application. Bandwidth allocated to the monitored network connection is incrementally adjusted until the flow of the network traffic for the rogue application achieves a steady state of bandwidth restriction. The flow of subsequent network traffic over the monitored network connection is controlled at the steady state of bandwidth restriction.

Still other embodiments of the present invention will become readily apparent to those skilled in the art from the following detailed description, wherein is described embodiments of the invention by way of illustrating the best mode contemplated for carrying out the invention. As will be realized, the invention is capable of other and different embodiments and its several details are capable of modifications in various obvious respects, all without departing from the spirit and the scope of the present invention. Accordingly, the drawings and detailed description are to be regarded as illustrative in nature and not as restrictive.

Brief Description of the Drawings

FIGURE 1 is a block diagram showing a system for dynamically controlling a rogue application through incremental bandwidth restrictions in accordance with the present invention.

FIGURE 2A is a topological network diagram showing a file transfer setup operation facilitated by a rogue application.

FIGURE 2B is a topological network diagram showing the file transfer download operation transacted with a remote host.

FIGURE 3 is a block diagram showing network traffic including packets generated to evade bandwidth restrictions.

FIGURE 4 is a functional block diagram showing the modules of the system of FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 5 is a state diagram showing a finite state machine for identifying an evasive action threshold.

FIGURE 6 is a flow diagram showing a method for dynamically controlling a rogue application through incremental bandwidth restrictions in accordance with the present invention.

FIGURE 7 is a flow diagram showing a routine for analyzing flow characteristics for use in the method FIGURE 6.

Detailed Description

FIGURE 1 is a block diagram showing a system for dynamically controlling a rogue application through incremental bandwidth restrictions 10, in accordance with the present invention. By way of example, a set of intranetworks 11a, 11b, 11c each define separate subnetworks. The individual systems 13a-d and 13i-l are part of the same logical subnetwork, although the physical addresses of the system are on separate segments. The individual systems 13e-h are part of a separate logical subnetwork. Finally, the individual systems 13m-p are part of a subnetwork physically distinct from the intranetworks 11a, 11b and remotely located over an internetwork 15.

Internally, the individual systems 13a-d and 13e-h each are interconnected by a hub 12a, 12b or similar device. In turn, each hub 12a, 12b is interconnected via a boundary hub 12c which feeds into a gateway router 14 at the network domain boundary. The gateway router 14 provides connectivity to the intranetwork 11c and one or more remote hosts 16 via the internetwork 15. Other network topologies and configurations are feasible, including various combinations of intranetworks and internetworks, as would be recognized by one skilled in the art. In the described embodiment, both the internetwork 15 and individual intranetworks 11a, 11b, 11c are IP compliant.

Packets are exchanged between the individual systems 13a-d, 13e-h, 13i-l, and 13m-p in the intranetworks 11a, 11b, 11c and remote hosts 16 in the internetwork 15. All packet traffic travels between the separate intranetworks 11a, 11b, 11c and to and from the internetwork 15 by way of the gateway router 14. Note the packets sent to and from individual systems 13a-d and 13i-l within

the intranetwork 11a do not go through gateway router 14. While in transit, the packet traffic flows through a traffic manager 17 which monitors and analyzes the traffic for traffic management and flow control. Packet traffic is dynamically classified for use in controlling bandwidth allocation according to automatically determined application requirements, such as described in commonly-assigned U.S. Patent application Serial No. 09/198,090, filed November 23, 1998, pending, the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference.

As further described below, beginning with reference to FIGURE 4, the traffic manager 17 identifies network traffic generated by proscribed "rogue" applications and incrementally applies bandwidth restrictions up to a dynamically determined bandwidth threshold. Rogue applications resist efforts at detection and actively take evasive actions or some forms of negative responses when placed under a bandwidth restriction by the traffic manager 17. For instance, a rogue application executing on system 13a might attempt to evade bandwidth restrictions placed on a connection with remote system 13m by changing the direction of the transfer, network addresses, or ports. Instead, the traffic manager 17 "tolerates" the transfer by allocating minimal bandwidth calculated to avoid triggering evasive actions or negative responses by the rogue application.

The individual computer systems, including systems 13a-d, 13e-h, 13i-l, 13m-p and remote hosts 16, are general purpose, programmed digital computing devices consisting of a central processing unit (CPU), random access memory (RAM), non-volatile secondary storage, such as a hard drive or CD-ROM drive, network interfaces, and peripheral devices, including user-interfacing means, such as a keyboard and display. Program code, including software programs, and data are loaded into the RAM for execution and processing by the CPU and results are generated for display, output, transmittal, or storage.

FIGURE 2A is a topological network diagram showing a file transfer setup operation 20 facilitated by a rogue application 23. By way of example, a client 21 executing on a system 21 operating within a first subnetwork 22 is attempting to perform a bandwidth-intensive file transfer using file transfer services provided by the rogue application 23 remotely located over the

internetwork 15. The rogue application 23 facilitates file transfers by identifying hosts 28 at which individual files are stored for download.

To initiate a file transfer, the client 21 sends a request (step ①) to the rogue application 23. The request passes through the traffic manager 24 (step ②) and gateway router 25 (step ③) until received at the rogue application 23 via the internetwork 26 (step ④). The rogue application 23 determines a host 28, possibly located in a separate subnetwork 27, and sends a reply (step ⑤) back to the client 21. The reply follows the same path through the internetwork 26, the gateway router 25 (step ⑥), and traffic manager (step ⑦) in returning back to the client 21. Upon receiving the response, the client 21 begins the actual file transfer download.

FIGURE 2B is a topological network diagram showing the file transfer download operation 29 transacted with a remote host 28. As the rogue application 23 does not actually store the requested file, the client 21 attempts to obtain the file from the host 28 identified by the rogue application 23. The host 28 is remotely located over the internetwork 26 in a separate subnetwork 27. Consequently, all file transfers with the host 28 consume limited bandwidth on the internetwork connection.

The client 21 sends a file transfer request (step ①) to the identified host 28. The request again travels through the traffic manager 24 (step ②) and the gateway router 25 (step ③) and is sent via the internetwork 26. The request is received by the host 28 (step ④) which retrieves the requested file and generates a reply (step ⑤) that is sent back to the client 21. The reply is sent over the internetwork 26 and through the gateway router 25 (step ⑥) and traffic manager 24 (step ⑦).

To avoid detection and any bandwidth restrictions imposed by the traffic manager 24, the client 21 and rogue application 23 can dynamically change the operational characteristics of the file transfer. FIGURE 3 is a block diagram showing network traffic including packets generated to evade bandwidth restrictions. The client 21 initially generates and attempts to send a request packet 30 to the rogue application 23. By way of example, the request packet 30

includes a source address (SRC Addr) of *124.124.124.001*, source port (SRC Port) of *1025*, destination address (DST Addr) of *64.124.41.16* and destination port (DST Port) of *8875*.

However, the request packet 31 might be blocked 31, such as by a firewall or traffic manager 17 (shown in FIGURE 1). If no reply is received from the rogue application 23 within a set time period, the rogue application 23 will take evasive action or generate some form of negative response by changing the operational characteristics of the file transfer request 30 and generates a new request packet 32 addressed to a "new" system located at a network address different from the system to which the request packet 30 was originally sent. Again, by way of example, the new request packet 32 has a destination address (DST Addr) of *208.184.216.222* and destination port (DST Port) of *6700*. Notably, the destination address and port are different than that specified in the request packet 31 of *64.124.41.16* and *8875*, respectively.

Upon receiving the reply packet 31, the client 21 will begin sending subsequent request packets 32 using the new operational characteristics as the source address and port.

FIGURE 4 is a functional block diagram showing the modules 40 of the system of FIGURE 1. The system 40 is implemented within the traffic manager 17 (shown in FIGURE 1) and works in conjunction with the basic traffic manager logic 41. The traffic manager 17 operates in a promiscuous mode, wherein all network traffic passes through. To address the problem of packet traffic being exchanged by systems spanning the network domain boundary yet located within the same subnetwork, the traffic manager 17 stores the physical media access controller (MAC) address of the gateway router 14. Packets outbound from the traffic manager 17 having a MAC address other than that of the gateway router 14 are identified as intranetwork packets and are handled in the same manner as any other intra-intranetwork or intranetwork-to-intranetwork packet.

An exemplary example of a traffic manager 17 suitable for use in the present invention is the Packet Shaper product operating in conjunction with Packet Wise software, version 5.0.0, sold and licensed by Packeteer, Inc., of

Cupertino, California. In the described embodiment, the traffic manager 24 adjusts the TCP window size parameter to control and restrict the amount of bandwidth used by each of the subscribing applications within each subnetwork. The traffic manager 17 looks at traffic at multiple network layers, including the network, transport and application layers.

The system 40 consists of two basic modules. A flow analyzer module 42 analyzes packets transiting the traffic manager 17. The analyzer 42 inspects the source and destination addresses and ports of each transient packet as queued into an inside packet queue 44 and an outside packet queue 45. The inside packet queue 44 stages packets being received from and forwarded to the internal intranetwork domain. The outside packet queue 45 stages packets being received from and forwarded to the external internetwork domain. The analyzer module 42 analyzes the flow characteristics of the transient packet traffic to identify potentially proscribed flows connecting to rogue applications. The flow analyzer 43 examines the contents of each packet and compares the operational characteristics against addresses maintained in a service table 47 and logical channels monitored in a ports table 48. Identified proscribed flows are forwarded to the flow monitor 44 for further handling.

The flow monitor 44 monitors and imposes bandwidth restrictions 49 on transient packet traffic flowing over the network domain boundary. In the ordinary case of a non-rogue application, the bandwidth restrictions 49 generally present no impediment to ongoing communications. However, when dealing with rogue applications, the bandwidth restrictions 49 can provoke evasive actions or some forms of negative responses designed to subvert the intention of bandwidth restrictions 49. Consequently, the flow monitor 44 will incrementally increase the bandwidth restrictions 49 placed on a proscribed flow with a rogue application up to a dynamically determined threshold, ideally just short of a point where the bandwidth restriction would trigger an evasive action or some form of negative response from the rogue application. The flow monitor 44 thus prevents rogue applications from subverting traffic management efforts through means such as

the switching of client-server roles or the reassignment of source and destination addresses and ports, also known as address or port "hopping."

Each module within the system 40 is a computer program, procedure or module written as source code in a conventional programming language, such as the C++ programming language, and is presented for execution by the CPU as object or byte code, as is known in the art. The various implementations of the source code and object and byte codes can be held on a computer-readable storage medium or embodied on a transmission medium in a carrier wave. The system 40 operates in accordance with a sequence of process steps, as further described below beginning with reference to FIGURE 6.

FIGURE 5 is a state diagram showing a finite state machine 60 for identifying an evasive action threshold. Each rogue application has a bandwidth restriction threshold that triggers evasive action or other form of negative response. The traffic manager 17 can dynamically identify the threshold by incrementally increasing the bandwidth restrictions 49 (shown in FIGURE 4) until the evasive action or other form of negative response is triggered, after which the bandwidth restriction 49 is relaxed about one increment. The bandwidth restrictions 49 are adjusted once per flow and any bandwidth restriction changes will take effect upon the next communication with the rogue application.

There are four states applying to the bandwidth restrictions 49: decrease 61, increase and revert 62, store 63, and stable 64. In effect, the traffic manager 41 will oscillate between decreasing bandwidth 61 and increasing bandwidth 62 until a stable bandwidth restriction 64 is found.

The traffic manager 41 begins by decreasing the bandwidth 61 allocated to a flow identified with a rogue application. If the rogue application takes evasive action or other form of negative response (transition 67), the traffic manager 41 increases the bandwidth 62, preferably by one increment back to the last stored bandwidth restriction. Upon the next new flow (transition 68), the bandwidth restriction will be stable 64 and each subsequent new flow (transition 69) will be restricted to the same stable bandwidth amount.

Otherwise, if the decrease in bandwidth 61 does not trigger evasive action or other form of negative response (transition 65), the new current bandwidth restriction 49 is stored 63. The stored bandwidth restriction is then used upon the next new flow with the rogue application (transition 66).

FIGURE 6 is a flow diagram showing a method for controlling aggressive rogue applications 80 in a distributed computing environment in accordance with the present invention. The purpose of this routine is to identify and control packet traffic exchanged with a rogue application. The routine will incrementally restrict bandwidth until evasive action or other form of negative response is triggered and then back off to a point of stable bandwidth restriction on subsequent flows. By way of example, a source code listing for performing the routine for analyzing flow characteristics written in the C programming language is included in the Appendix.

Thus, upon the start of a new flow with a rogue application (block 81), the flow characteristics will be analyzed (block 82), as further described below, by way of example, with reference to FIGURE 7. If the flow belongs to a rogue application (block 83), the bandwidth restriction control loop (blocks 84-89) (as described above with reference to FIGURE 5) is performed. Any previously determined bandwidth restriction policy is applied (block 84) and the flow is monitored (block 85). If the rogue application performs using the default operational characteristics, such as known network addresses and ports (block 86), no further actions are required. Otherwise, if the rogue application is not performing in accordance with default characteristics (block 86) and is taking evasive action or other form of negative response (block 87), the bandwidth is increased on the next flow with the rogue application (block 88), preferably by one increment. Otherwise, if no evasive action or other form of negative response has been taken (block 87), the bandwidth to the rogue application is reduced on the next flow (block 89). The method then terminates.

FIGURE 7 is a flow diagram showing a routine for analyzing flow characteristics 100 for use in the method 80 of FIGURE 6. The purpose of this routine is to analyze the flow characteristics of transient packet traffic being

exchanged with an unknown application to identify a flow belonging to a rogue application. By way of example, the flow characteristics described herein apply to a conversation with a Napster server, although one skilled in the art would recognize that similar types of analyses would apply to other rogue applications. The routine proceeds in three stages, first looking for connections to a Napster server (blocks 101-113), then for a Napster login (blocks 114-123), and finally for raw Napster data flows (blocks 124-137).

Thus, a Napster login is detected (blocks 101-113) by looking at the commonly used Napster port numbers (blocks 101-105) and server addresses (blocks 106-110). For each of the known initial Napster port numbers (blocks 101-105), each packet is checked for a commonly used Napster port number (block 102). If the port number matches (block 103), a flag, *Probably Napster Init*, is set (block 104).

Similarly, for each of the known Napster server addresses (blocks 106-110), each packet is checked by comparing the address in the packet to the known addresses found through a DNS look-up of the URL "*server.napster.com*" (block 107). If the address matches (block 108), the *Probably Napster Init* flag is set (block 109).

After checking the commonly used Napster port numbers (blocks 101-105) and server addresses (blocks 106-110), if the *Probably Napster Init* flag is set (block 111), the initial connection is parsed (block 112) and a *Napster Service Init* indicator is returned (block 113), indicating that a Napster rogue application flow has been identified.

During the next stage (blocks 114-123), the traffic manager 41 looks for logins to the Napster server. The traffic manager 41 will look at the first five packets for a Napster flow (block 114). First, the known Napster command port numbers are examined (blocks 115-119) by checking each packet against the commonly used Napster command port numbers (block 116). If a match is found (block 117), a *Napster Service Command* flag is returned to indicate that a Napster rogue application has been identified (block 118).

Next, the flow is inspected for characteristics that indicate the flow may relate to a Napster command. One such characteristic is a TCP header data length whereby the first two bytes equal the length of the packet minus four bytes (block 120). If so, the packet is checked for a known login type (block 121), which, in the described embodiment, consists of login messages types '2' and '6.' If the login type matches (block 122), a *Napster Service Command* flag is returned to indicate that a Napster rogue application has been identified (block 123).

Finally, during the final stage (blocks 124-137), the traffic manager 41 looks for raw Napster data flows. First, the commonly known Napster data port numbers are examined (blocks 124-128) by checking the port number in each packet against the commonly-used Napster data port numbers (block 125). If a data port number matches (block 126), a *Napster Data Service* flag is returned (block 127).

Otherwise, the flow is examined for further characteristics that indicate a potential attempt to transact a Napster upload or download file transfer operation. For example, if the data length of the packet equals one byte (block 130), the flow is saved in a list of potential Napster flows (block 132). Similarly, if the packet contains a "GET" or "SEND" command (block 131), the flow is also saved in the list of potential Napster flows (block 132). Finally, if the flow is saved in the list of potential Napster flows (block 134), a *Napster Data Service* flag is returned (block 135). Otherwise, if the flow has not been saved (block 134), a *Service Unknown* flag is returned (block 136). The analysis continues for the first five packets (blocks 114-137), after which the routine returns.

While the invention has been particularly shown and described as referenced to the embodiments thereof, those skilled in the art will understand that the foregoing and other changes in form and detail may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.